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Healthcare price transparency discussions typically focus on increasing patients’ 
access to information about their out-of-pocket costs, but that focus is too nar-
row and should include other audiences—physicians, employers, health plans 
and policymakers—each with distinct needs and uses for healthcare price 
information. Greater price transparency can reduce U.S. healthcare spending. 
For example, an estimated $100 billion could be saved over the next 10 years 
if three select interventions were undertaken. However, most of the projected 
savings come from making price information available to employers and physi-
cians, according to an analysis by researchers at the former Center for Studying 
Health System Change (HSC). Based on the current availability and modest 
impact of plan-based transparency tools, requiring all private plans to provide 
personalized out-of-pocket price data to enrollees would reduce total health 
spending by an estimated $18 billion over the next decade. While $18 billion is 
a substantial dollar amount, it is less than a tenth of a percent of the $40 tril-
lion in total projected health spending over the same period. In contrast, using 
state all-payer claims databases to gather and report hospital-specific prices 
might reduce spending by an estimated $61 billion over 10 years.
The effects of price transparency depend critically on the intended audience, 
the decision-making context and how prices are presented. And the impact of 
price transparency can be greatly amplified if target audiences are able and moti-
vated to act on the information. Simply providing prices is insufficient to control 
spending without other shifts in healthcare financing, including changes in benefit 
design to make patients more sensitive to price differences among providers and 
alternative treatments. Other reforms that can amplify the impact of price trans-
parency include shifting from fee-for-service payments that reward providers for 
volume to payment methods that put providers at risk for spending for episodes 
of care or defined patient populations. While price transparency alone seems 
unlikely to transform the healthcare system, it can play a needed role in enabling 
effective reforms in value-based benefit design and provider payment. 
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Price Transparency in Healthcare:           
The State of Play
There is broad consensus among policy experts that U.S. 
health spending is inappropriately high and that the health-
care system is woefully inefficient. Some analysts believe 
high prices for medical care lie at the heart of the spending 
problem.1 But privately insured patients traditionally have 
had little reason to worry about prices because they were 
shielded by generous insurance coverage. Historically, even 
if they wanted to comparison shop, patients seeking price 
information would have had to burrow through the thick-
ets of secrecy and technical jargon surrounding healthcare 
prices. As private health coverage becomes less compre-
hensive and patients shoulder more of the cost of their care 
directly through increased cost sharing, awareness of ques-
tionable healthcare pricing practices is growing. 
Today, questions relating to medical prices are at the cen-
ter of the health spending discussion. A growing body of 
research makes clear that prices paid to providers by private 
health plans vary widely within and across markets. But wide 
differences in unit prices for specific services are just the tip 
of the iceberg—physicians practice differently and recom-
mend different courses of treatment for the same clinical 
condition. Visiting a physician who tends to recommend an 
aggressive course of care, above and beyond accepted guide-
lines, can significantly raise a patient’s out-of-pocket costs.2
Price transparency generally refers to the ready availabil-
ity of price data for the purpose of comparison shopping. 
In healthcare, the price transparency discussion usually 
focuses on patients and providing them with more infor-
mation on out-of-pocket costs. That focus is far too narrow. 
Shopping for healthcare is a multistep process involving 
five key audiences—patients, physicians, employers, health 
plans and policymakers (see Figure 1)—each with distinct 
needs and uses for price information.
This analysis describes the different audiences’ needs for 
price information and assesses the extent to which those 
needs are being met; explores the policy options for pro-
moting price transparency; and quantifies three examples 
of the many possible policy interventions related to price 
transparency and their impacts on healthcare spending 
over the next 10 years. 
Patient-Targeted Price Transparency
Patients make several key decisions in the healthcare shop-
ping process: which health plan to enroll in, which primary 
There is broad consensus among policy 
experts that U.S. health spending is inappro-
priately high and that the healthcare system 
is woefully inefficient. 
When selecting a physician, patients need to know the 
out-of-pocket cost for visiting that physician, but the full 
price of choosing a physician depends on how physicians 
practice and what treatments they recommend. Patients 
ideally would know whether physicians are efficient—do 
they only recommend necessary tests and procedures, and 
do they refer their patients to efficient specialists and facili-
ties? The out-of-pocket cost of a visit in many cases pales 
in comparison to the costs associated with the follow-up 
services physicians recommend.
When selecting a treatment path and where to receive 
treatment, patients need to know the out-of-pocket costs 
of different treatment options and providers (see page 5 for 
more about patient-targeted price tools).
Comparison shopping by patients can reduce healthcare 
spending in two ways. The first is the direct effect of some 
patients shifting from higher-price to lower-price provid-
ers. If low-price providers render a larger share of services, 
average prices and total spending will be lower. The second 
is the strategic effect on high-price providers. If high-
price providers perceive that they are losing, or may begin 
care physician or specialist to seek care from, and, in some 
non-emergency situations, which treatment to receive and 
where. Different types of price information are relevant at 
each of the decision points.
When selecting a plan, the necessary price data include 
both the premium paid by the enrollee and the level and 
range of out-of-pocket payments they are likely to face 
at the point of care—for example, the applicable deduct-
ibles, coinsurance and copayments. The Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) has advanced price transparency by requiring 
health plans available on exchanges to provide standard-
ized benefits and cost-sharing tiers (bronze, silver, gold or 
platinum). The total cost of the plan—premium plus cost 
sharing—can then be compared against the breadth of the 
provider network, the perceived quality and convenience of 
the providers, and other factors.
growing prevalence of high-deductible health plans. Private 
plans with individual deductibles of $1,000 or more now 
cover 58 percent of enrollees in small firms—three to 199 
workers—and 28 percent of enrollees in large firms—200 
or more workers.11 The ACA builds on this trend. Virtually 
all plans in the bronze tier have very high deductibles, and 
among plans in the silver tier, which to date is the most 
popular option by a large margin, the average deductible is 
nearly $3,000. Even in the gold tier, the average individual 
deductible exceeds $1,000.12 Moreover, employers increasing-
ly are experimenting with private exchanges where employ-
ees essentially are given a voucher—or a defined contribu-
tion by the employer—to shop for a health plan from a range 
to lose, patient volume, they may rein in their prices or 
change their practice patterns. For example, the California 
Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) imple-
mented a reference pricing system in 2011 that capped 
payments for knee and hip replacements and was designed 
to steer patients to lower-price hospitals. In short order, 
several high-price hospitals lowered their negotiated prices 
to retain patients.10 Such strategic effects are difficult to 
measure, but they may have even larger spending impacts 
than the direct effects of shifts in patient volume.
Greater price transparency also is important because 
patients are being asked to take more responsibility for their 
healthcare decision making. One aspect of this trend is the 
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Figure 1
The Healthcare Shopping Process
Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Over the last decade, it has become the norm for private 
health plans to make a price transparency tool available 
to enrollees (see Figure 2). All of the major national carri-
ers—Aetna, Cigna, Humana and UnitedHealthcare—offer 
some sort of patient-targeted price tool, as do the major 
multistate Blue plans—Anthem and Health Care Services 
Corp.—and some independent Blue plans. In addition to  
price tools provided directly by health plans, third-party 
vendors—for example, Castlight,3 Change Healthcare4 and 
Health Care Blue Book—contract with plans and large 
employers to provide price transparency tools. 
These plan and vendor price tools vary in their func-
tionality but generally allow patients to obtain personal-
ized price quotes, compare different providers and deter-
mine their out-of-pocket payment before receiving a ser-
vice.5 A recent review of the strengths and weaknesses of 
several of these tools, including Aetna’s Member Payment 
Estimator, United’s myHealthcare Cost Estimator and 
Cigna’s Health Life,6 found that the tools are generally 
useful for comparison shopping. These tools can help 
steer patients to lower-price, in-network providers and 
settings, such as a freestanding imaging center rather than 
a hospital outpatient department. Some tools can help 
patients explore the risks and benefits of alternative treat-
ment paths, such as conventional X-rays vs. CAT scans.
Independent organizations, such as FairHealth and 
Clear Health Costs, also offer patient-targeted price tools 
as a public service. These tools’ capabilities and usefulness 
are severely limited, however, because they lack access 
to several key pieces of data. Those data include large 
claims databases with allowed amounts, which are needed 
to estimate service-, provider-, and plan-specific prices, 
as well as information on each individual’s cost-sharing 
liability and the plan’s provider network.
Several state governments also offer patient-facing price 
tools. Three New England states—Maine, Massachusetts 
and New Hampshire—stand out for offering price tools 
that are relatively useful to patients. These tools are based 
on claims data gathered in state-run all-payer claims data-
bases (APCDs). Despite greater access to detailed claims 
data, the usefulness for patients of APCD-based tools is 
limited by a lack of integration with health plans—they 
cannot, for example, automatically customize price quotes 
based on the benefit structure of an individual’s plan or an 
individual’s deductible and spending to date.
While patient-targeted price tools are ubiquitous, the 
reality is that few patients use them. A 2012-13 survey 
of health plans found that “while 98 percent of respond-
ing plans said they offer a cost calculator tool, just two 
percent of their patient members use these tools.”7 Price 
shopping—checking the price before receiving a medi-
cal service—is more common in high-deductible health 
plans than in traditional plans, but it is still relatively 
rare.8 Partly this reflects that, over any period, most 
individuals do not have new healthcare needs arise, and 
many of those who do are enrolled in plans that largely 
shield them from out-of-pocket costs. For reasons that 
are unclear, even patients using healthcare services and 
enrolled in a high-deductible plan only sought price data 
for about 10 percent of the services they used.9
The current challenge is not simply to make a price tool 
available but to design tools that patients will use and pro-
vide incentives that reward such use. Some vendors, such 
as Compass, offer “high-touch” price tools that include a 
phone-in call center and financial rewards for choosing low-
er-price providers. Another vendor, Change Healthcare, uses 
push technologies to proactively target price information for 
specific services to individual patients based on their care 
utilization patterns. It remains to be seen what approaches 
work best and what level of patient engagement is possible.
Patient-Targeted Price Tools: Widely Available, Rarely Used
of carriers and benefit designs. These public and private 
exchanges create strong incentives for individuals to enroll in 
plans that will steer them to lower-cost providers.
Although patients’ decision-making role is important 
and growing, there are several important limits. First, even 
though high-deductible plans are becoming more common, 
enrollees in a typical private plan still pay only about 15 
percent of total spending out of pocket at the point of care, 
which limits incentives to shop on price.13 Much of that 15 
percent is spent on services that are not “shoppable,” such 
as emergency care,14 and services that are determined to be 
necessary after the patient chooses a provider, such as an 
inpatient admission following evaluation in the emergency 
room. Typical benefit designs—for example, fixed-dollar 
copayments for physician office visits—further limit the 
relevance of price information for the privately insured.15
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Figure 2
Share of the U.S. Privately Insured Population with Access to Patient-Targeted Price Transparency Tool
Note: Population shares are historical (through 2013) and projected (2014 and beyond).
Source: Authors’ calculations using original data collected on health plans providing a price transparency tool and when they began offering those tools and published health 
plan enrollment data from HealthLeaders InterStudy, The HealthLeaders-InterStudy Competitive Edge Managed Care Directory (2010).
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Second, patients, and even providers, often do not know 
in advance which services will be required when a provider is 
chosen, making comparison shopping difficult and imprecise.
Third, many patients reject the notion of price shopping 
for healthcare, and insist, in principle at least, on getting 
the best care possible regardless of the cost to themselves or 
society (see page 7 for more about the complementary roles 
of price and quality transparency).
Physician-Targeted Price Transparency
Many have said that the most expensive piece of medi-
cal technology is a physician’s pen. Even though physician 
income is a relatively small share of overall healthcare reve-
nues, their ordering behavior plays a central role in health-
care delivery and spending trends. Patients rely on physi-
cians’ expertise and judgment to guide decisions about 
treatments, specialists, hospitals and other facilities.
Physician decision making reflects a complex mix of 
professional ethics, financial self-interest, guesswork and 
rules of thumb. Historically, both ethical and financial 
considerations have tended to encourage costly patterns of 
care. Physicians can, in principle, use price information to 
guide patients toward higher-value treatment options and 
providers. To do so, physicians need to embrace frugality 
as a value, and they need data on the cost to the healthcare 
system of the treatments they are ordering and the cost dif-
ferences between treatment options. They also would, ide-
ally, know patients’ out-of-pocket obligations.
Increasingly, professional societies are encouraging 
physicians to be more cost-conscious. For example, the 
American Board of Internal Medicine Foundation’s charter 
and Choosing Wisely campaign both promote stewardship 
of resources as one facet of physician professionalism.18 
Some physicians will accept such a responsibility because 
they believe it is part of serving the patient. Others will 
be motivated to obtain this information to respond con-
structively to reformed payment methods, such as episode 
bundling and accountable care organizations (ACOs) that 
put physicians at financial risk for the costs of care. Indeed, 
insurers contracting with ACOs see delivering real-time 
claims data as critical to the success of these payment 
approaches. 
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However, many physicians, like their patients, reject the 
notion that price shopping is part of their role, partly on 
principle and also because of time constraints. Additionally, 
physicians, when they are ordering services, are generally 
unaware of costs and the financial impact on patients.19 
Financial incentives, such as shared-savings arrangements, 
can help change this, but a cultural shift in the medical 
profession also will be necessary.20 The American College 
of Physicians significantly advanced that shift in the 2012 
edition of its Ethics Manual, which recognized physicians’ 
responsibility to practice “parsimonious care.”21
Employer- and Health Plan-Targeted    
Price Transparency
Employers provide coverage to 90 percent of privately 
insured Americans under age 65 and are a central player 
in the healthcare shopping process.22 For large employ-
ers, buying healthcare in bulk on behalf of their workers 
may give them significant potential leverage over health 
plans and providers. Some, however, argue that employers 
generally fail to use their buying leverage and instead pas-
sively finance an increasingly inefficient and dysfunctional 
healthcare market.23
Employers delegate to health plans the task of negotiat-
ing prices and contracting with providers, and those nego-
tiated prices are key drivers of the premiums that employ-
ers pay. Recent research indicates that negotiated prices 
deserve closer scrutiny. The prices that private health plans 
negotiate with providers often significantly exceed prices 
paid by public payers and international benchmarks.24 
Private prices also tend to vary widely from market to mar-
ket, from hospital to hospital and, to a lesser extent, from 
physician group to physician group.25
In principle, competition among private health plans 
should encourage aggressive price negotiations with provid-
ers. But in practice, negotiated prices reflect a tangled web of 
market imperfections, including:
•	 provider market power—health plans are unable to 
negotiate competitive prices;
•	 health plan market power—dominant health plans can 
maintain market share even if they do not negotiate 
competitive prices;
•	 pass-through financing of self-funded employer plans—
the employer, not the health plan, is paying the negoti-
ated prices;
Price and Quality Transparency             
Play Complementary Roles
At every step in the healthcare shopping process, the 
key question is not just price, but value. Assessing value 
means comparing price information with information on 
the clinical benefit of the services and the quality of the 
provider, including their technical skill and the patient 
experience. Measuring clinical benefits and quality of 
care are the subjects of massive, multi-pronged research 
efforts that are moving forward quickly but nowhere near 
complete.
Some patients assume that higher-price providers offer 
higher-quality care.16 As a result, analysts have warned 
that publicizing price data could perversely steer patients 
toward higher-price providers.
However, advances in price transparency and quality 
measurement complement each other, with each spur-
ring the other along and making the other more useful. 
For example, patient-targeted price transparency tools 
are increasingly incorporating quality metrics, helping 
to reassure patients that they can choose a lower-price 
provider and still receive high-quality care. And the pub-
lication of hospital price data in Massachusetts in 2010 
led to an ongoing discussion of whether existing quality 
metrics adequately capture meaningful differences among 
providers.17
•	 historical carryovers—some providers’ high prices are 
perpetuated by standardized annual updates;
•	 mixed allegiances—some health plans were founded by 
medical providers and maintain those ties; and
•	 perverse incentives—plans can satisfy minimum-loss 
ratios by paying high prices and having high claims 
costs. 
Generally, private health plans hope to avoid conflicts 
with providers, and each plan merely needs to negotiate 
prices that allow it to compete with other private health 
plans, even if they all are paying excessively high prices. 
Employer access and use of negotiated price information 
varies. At one extreme are large, self-funded employers or 
purchasers, such as Safeway or CalPERS. Because they are 
self-funded, they are able to access their enrollees’ detailed 
claims records, including paid amounts and provider iden-
tifiers. And because they are extremely large, these employ-
West Health Policy Center Policy Analysis • May 2014
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Policymaker-Targeted Price Transparency
There are deep disagreements about the nature of the 
health system’s dysfunction and the appropriate roles for 
the public and private sectors. Underpinning these debates 
are questions related to healthcare prices: Do public plans 
pay prices that are too low, or do private plans pay prices 
that are too high? Do some hospitals or physician organi-
zations have too much market power? Or, do some health 
plans have too much market power? 
In the U.S. healthcare market, private and public pay-
ers take dramatically different approaches to establishing 
prices for medical services. Private plans use a market-
based approach and negotiate prices and other contract 
terms with providers. Public plans—primarily Medicare 
and Medicaid—generally use administered pricing and set 
prices through statutory formulas and regulations at the 
state or federal level.32 Public plans generally offer price 
schedules that are relatively uniform within local health-
care markets. Currently, total U.S. health spending is split 
roughly evenly between these two pricing arrangements 
(see Figure 3).
Policymakers need price data at an aggregate level to 
compare prices with the costs of producing medical ser-
vices and to assess whether public and private mechanisms 
ers have large volumes of claims data and the resources to 
support customized analytics.26 At the other extreme are 
small employers buying fully insured health plans—they do 
not have access to their claims data, and they typically have 
little or no information on their carrier’s negotiated prices. 
In between are mid-sized employers that may be self-fund-
ed but lack the resources to analyze their own data and are 
instead dependent on carriers and brokers. Data warehous-
ers, such as Truven Health Analytics and Milliman, can 
analyze self-funded employers’ claims data and compare 
them with external benchmarks, but their services are 
expensive, and the findings are provided with stipulations 
that they not be shared widely.
New Hampshire illustrates the potential for price trans-
parency to increase employer engagement in the healthcare 
shopping process.27 In that state, a major state-led price 
transparency initiative made employers more supportive of 
health plans in their negotiations with high-price hospitals. 
Employers, faced with wide variation in prices for the same 
services, also moved toward benefit designs that reward 
patients for using lower-price providers.
Unlike employers, health plans know, in great detail, the 
prices and the contract terms they have negotiated with 
individual providers. In the course of business, health plans 
also generally become aware of the prices that competing 
health plans have negotiated with those same providers.28 
Where health plans are more limited is in understanding 
the efficiency and treatment patterns of individual physi-
cians and physician groups. That type of analysis requires a 
very large volume of claims data that includes standardized 
physician identifiers.
There has been progress in recent years in making large 
volumes of claims data available for physician profiling. In 
2006, Consumers’ CHECKBOOK, a nonprofit publisher of 
information enabling consumers to be better purchasers of 
services, submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
request to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) to receive Medicare physician claims data with physi-
cian identifiers. HHS initially denied that request,29 but has 
since reconsidered and reversed that position.30 On April 9, 
2014, CMS completed that turnaround and made a massive 
Medicare physician claims dataset freely available online. 
That dataset reports each physician’s name and address, their 
national provider identifier, the number of Medicare benefi-
ciaries they treated, the specific services they provided, and 
the amount Medicare paid for each type of service.31
Figure 3
U.S. Health Spending Split Evenly Between 
Publicly and Privately Insured, 2013
11% Medicaid
37%  Medicare
Private (insurer) 
44% 
7% Private (patient) 1% Uninsured
Notes: Spending is allocated to Medicare, Medicaid and private based on the primary 
source of coverage of the individual. Medicare includes Medicare fee for service and 
Advantage, and Medicaid includes publicly administered plans and private Medicaid 
managed care plans.
Sources: Authors’ calculations using the National Health Expenditures (NHE), historical 
through 2011 and projected for 2013, and the NHE-aligned Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey.
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for determining prices are operating appropriately. If not, 
policymakers can decide whether and how to support bet-
ter price-setting, either by enhancing competitive forces or 
through regulation.
Price transparency can promote discussion at the poli-
cymaking level about how the healthcare market should 
be organized and regulated. Massachusetts epitomizes that 
progression—a 2010 report by the state attorney general 
on hospital price variation helped spawn an ongoing dis-
cussion of price variation and price levels and a sweeping 
set of reforms targeted at reining in healthcare spending 
growth.33 However, some warn that publicizing negotiated 
prices could, depending on the circumstances, enable anti-
competitive behavior (see below for more about possible 
unintended consequences of price transparency).
Policy Options and the Impact                  
on Health Spending
Along with a range of policy options aimed at the various 
audiences, this analysis includes detailed descriptions and 
estimates of spending impacts for three examples of price 
transparency initiatives—chosen because they illustrate a 
range of feasible approaches and at least some evidence was 
available to estimate their impacts. For the three examples, 
spending is compared over a 10-year window—2014 
through 2023—with that one intervention in place versus 
baseline spending without the intervention (see Technical 
Appendix). This follows some of the conventions that the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) uses to estimate the 
impacts of proposed legislation on the federal budget. This 
approach, like CBO’s, is intended to illustrate the effects of 
Some economists have tried to temper the general enthu-
siasm for price transparency by highlighting its possible 
perverse effects. Price transparency in healthcare has the 
potential to support anticompetitive behavior and lead to 
higher prices, especially in highly concentrated provider 
markets.34 The notion is that, if all prices are publicized, 
low-price providers, such as hospitals, will demand so-
called me-too price increases, and high-price hospitals 
will be less willing to offer price cuts to specific health 
plans. The only well-documented case of such a perverse 
outcome comes from the market for government-pur-
chased concrete in Denmark—prices rose by 15 percent 
to 20 percent following a new requirement that they be 
posted publicly.35 The relevance of this concrete case to 
U.S. healthcare markets is questionable.
Making healthcare price data more widely available 
can have a mix of pro- and anti-competitive effects. The 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has described, in very 
general terms, the sorts of exchanges of healthcare price 
information that would raise anticompetitive concerns 
and possibly lead to enforcement action.36 Providers 
would likely face FTC scrutiny if they shared price infor-
mation with each other in a non-public way, particularly 
information regarding future price changes.
However, healthcare price data can be publicized in a 
way that maximizes pro-competitive effects and minimiz-
es anti-competitive effects—here the details matter.
•	 Price data that are a year or more old are less likely to 
produce anti-competitive outcomes, because a provider 
can cut prices and be rewarded with volume for some 
time before competitors find out.
•	 Price reports may be more pro-competitive if they include 
a level of detail that is appropriate to the audience and not 
excessive. For example, employers would find it useful to 
know that one hospital is paid prices 20 percent higher 
than its competitors after adjustment for case mix. But 
employers would not find it any more useful to know that 
the hospital is paid $X per diem for maternity and $Y per 
diem for psychiatric cases, and so on.
•	 Price reports will be more pro-competitive if anti-
competitive practices are discouraged. For example, 
some dominant private health plans have negotiated 
so-called most-favored nation (MFN) agreements with 
providers, which preclude them from agreeing to lower 
prices with other health plans. Publicizing price data 
in the presence of an MFN could help the dominant 
plan enforce the agreement, thereby helping to raise 
prices and spending. In that case, prohibiting MFNs, as 
Michigan has done, will have a direct pro-competitive 
effect and will also make price reports more pro-com-
petitive as well.37
Avoiding Unintended Consequences
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be difficult or impossible to regulate, in a helpful way, the 
type of price tool that must be provided, and providing a 
price tool might add costs to plans where prices are unim-
portant, such as health maintenance organizations with no 
deductibles and only fixed copayments (see box below for a 
detailed example of this policy option).
Allow patients to choose from a variety of price tools. 
Currently, health plans and price tools come as a package—
if your employer offers a United plan, you are more or less 
locked in to using United’s price tool. That lock-in may be 
inhibiting creative developments in price tools and patient 
engagement with those price tools. 
One way to expand patients’ price-tool options would be 
to guarantee patients’ free access to their own claims data in 
a standardized machine-readable format. Patients could then 
upload their claims data with an online price tool of their 
choice. This option builds on two policies already in place. 
various options, not to promote or argue against them. 
However, this analysis differs from a CBO score in key 
ways: First, it includes spending impacts across the health 
system not just impacts on federal spending; second, it 
includes a range of uncertainty based on the strength of the 
evidence and the range of ways to implement interventions; 
and, third, the interventions encompass actions by private 
purchasers, health plans and state governments, not just 
federal legislation.
Patient-Targeted Policy Options
Require all private health plans to provide a price tool for 
enrollees. This option could hasten the development and 
dissemination of patient-targeted price tools and help slow 
health spending growth slightly. But such an action would 
impose a regulatory requirement on a field of endeavor 
that is rapidly progressing and evolving on its own. It could 
Background
Among enrollees in private health plans, the share with 
access to a price transparency tool has increased rapidly 
over the last decade, but access is not universal. In 2012, 
Massachusetts enacted legislation that requires private 
health plans to offer a price transparency tool to their 
enrollees.38
What the Policy Option Would Do
The policy intervention would require by 2019—the ear-
liest feasible date—that all private health plans provide 
all enrollees with data on out-of-pocket and total prices 
using the following parameters:
•	 provider-specific—reflects the type of provider and the 
prices negotiated between the plan and the provider;
•	 patient-specific—takes into account the patient’s plan 
and benefit design and spending to date; and
•	 service-specific—to the extent possible, reflects the spe-
cific medical service that the patient expects to receive.
These out-of-pocket price data would be made available via a 
toll-free telephone number, website and mobile application.
The intervention could be accomplished in several 
ways. Large purchasers, such as CalPERS and the Federal 
Employee Health Benefit Program, could require that 
the health plans they contract with provide these tools 
to all enrollees, not just to enrollees covered by the large 
purchasers. Another approach, such as the one taken in 
Massachusetts, is to pass a state law requiring all carriers 
and third-party administrators that contract with the state 
employee plan to provide a price tool to all enrollees.39 
Or, Congress could pass federal legislation imposing the 
price-tool requirement on both self-funded plans and 
fully insured plans, similar to federal regulation of mental 
health parity.
Estimated Impact on Health Spending
The estimated reduction in total health spending from 
this intervention is $18 billion over 10 years, with a wide 
range of uncertainty ranging from $2 billion to $40 billion 
(see Table 1). The savings result from some patients, as a 
result of the intervention, using a price tool and choos-
ing lower-price providers. The savings are relatively small 
because relatively few privately insured people will be 
impacted—most are projected to have access to a price 
tool with or without any intervention.
Patient-Targeted Policy Intervention
Require all private plans to provide enrollees with a price 
transparency tool. Estimated reduction in health spend-
ing over 10 years: $18 billion.
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One is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA), which guarantees patients access to their 
medical records on request, including claims data.40 The sec-
ond is the voluntary Blue Button initiative, which is a tool to 
enable patients to access their healthcare records at various 
providers and their claims history online in a single place.41
Physician-Targeted Policy Options
Use federal requirements for electronic health records 
(EHRs) to make price data available to physicians in 
computerized order entry systems. The advantage of this 
option is that it piggybacks on the expanding use of elec-
tronic health records and adds price data to those infor-
mation flows. But the likelihood of physicians using the 
information will depend to a large extent on the reach of 
provider payment reforms. So in the same way that benefit 
designs are critical to the potential for price transparency 
for patients, provider payment reform is critical to the 
potential of price transparency for physicians (see page 12 
for a detailed example of this policy option).
Promote the discussion of the financial side effects of 
treatments with patients. Physicians widely recognize 
patients’ right to informed consent, meaning that they have 
the right to be informed of the risks of a treatment so that 
they can choose whether to receive the treatment. One 
goal could be to extend that concept to include a patient’s 
right to know the out-of-pocket costs—the financial side 
effects—of a treatment before agreeing to it.47
This approach has the advantage of building on the 
physician’s role as advocate for, and adviser to, the patient. 
Such an initiative would be most effective with the support 
of physician specialty societies, which could promote it 
through guidelines and disseminate tools for physicians to 
use through continuing medical education.
Employer- and Health Plan-Targeted   
Policy Options
Clarify that self-funded employers own their healthcare 
claims data and can use it to measure and report prices. 
Under HIPAA, self-funded employers can access their claims 
data and, subject to privacy restrictions, use those claims data 
to manage the plan. Even so, some carriers have objected to 
self-funded employers contracting with third-party vendors 
of price transparency tools and providing them with their 
plans’ claims data. Those objections often are based on gag 
clauses in insurer contracts that prohibit disclosure or conten-
tions that negotiated prices are the carrier’s trade secret.48
Some employers have been able to overrule carriers’ 
objections. But the trade secrets argument has not been 
decisively settled in court, and employers are justifiably wary 
of pushing the issue. Policymakers could help self-funded 
employers by clarifying that they own their claims data and 
may use those data to populate a price transparency tool—
subject, of course, to HIPAA privacy protections.
Table 1
Requiring Patient-Targeted Price Tools: Estimated Effects on U.S. Health Spending
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 10-Year 
Total
Estimated Effect on Health 
Spending (billions)
-$0.9 -$1.6 -$2.1 -$2.3 -$2.2 -$1.6 -$1.8 -$1.9 -$2.0 -$2.1 -$18.4
Lower Bound -$0.1 -$0.1 -$0.2 -$0.2 -$0.2 -$0.2 -$0.2 -$0.2 -$0.2 -$0.3 -$2.0
Upper Bound -$2.0 -$3.6 -$4.6 -$5.0 -$4.7 -$3.6 -$3.8 -$4.1 -$4.3 -$4.6 -$40.3
Spending on Medical Services 
among the Privately Insured—
Baseline (billions)
$771 $815 $859 $903 $960 $1025 $1090 $1156 $1222 $1291
Share of Privately Insured with 
Access to Price Tool—Baseline
73% 76% 80% 83% 87% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90%
Share of Privately Insured with 
Access to Price Tool—Policy 
Option
76% 82% 87% 91% 94% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95%
Note: Medical spending includes hospital care and physician and clinical services. 
Source: Authors’ calculations combining National Health Expenditures data, estimated shares of the population with access to a price transparency tool and published estimates of 
the impact of the price transparency tools.
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Background
Patients rely on physicians to use their expertise and judg-
ment to determine what treatments are necessary and to 
recommend where to receive those treatments. This policy 
option would help inject price data into the mix of factors 
that physicians consider when making recommendations, 
and focuses on the question of whether services are neces-
sary and appropriate rather than just lowering unit prices.
This policy option also would build on the federal 
government’s push for physicians and hospitals to expand 
their use of EHRs and computerized provider order entry 
(CPOE). Under the Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health, or HITECH, Act, physi-
cians and hospitals receive bonuses from Medicare and 
Medicaid if they can demonstrate so-called meaningful 
use of an EHR.42 Most hospitals and a large share of physi-
cians have met the initial requirements and are receiving 
bonuses. Over time, the requirements will become more 
stringent, and physicians and hospitals will begin to face 
penalties, in the form of reduced payments, if they do not 
meet them.
What the Policy Option Would Do
CMS has divided meaningful use requirements into stages 
(I, II and III). This policy option would add a new core 
requirement to the stage III meaningful use criteria for both 
hospitals and nonhospital-based physicians. The requirement 
would be that CPOEs for laboratory and imaging services 
present physicians with standardized price data. The price 
for each service would be programmed into the CPOE by 
the EHR vendor and would be based on the allowed amount 
under the Medicare fee schedule. This type of price reporting 
is rudimentary because it does not represent the price that 
will actually be paid to the provider unless the patient is cov-
ered by Medicare; the cost to the health system of providing 
the service; or the amount the patient would have to pay out 
of pocket. But, Medicare allowed amounts would provide a 
benchmark of the relative resources used to provide different 
diagnostic options. These price data would be displayed in 
real time, so that the physician can consider resource costs at 
the point of order entry.
A small-scale study conducted at Johns Hopkins Hospital 
in 2008-09 provides some evidence on possible effects of 
price displays for laboratory tests.43 The study compared 
ordering rates for two groups of laboratory tests in the inpa-
tient setting: standard fees (the Medicare allowed amount) 
were displayed in the intervention group but not in the 
control group. The study reported significantly fewer tests 
ordered in the intervention group, suggesting that price dis-
plays can alter physician ordering behavior, at least in that 
type of setting. A series of similar studies also examined the 
effects of price displays (see Figure 4). Although results range 
widely, they generally suggest that price displays tend to lead 
physicians to order fewer services.
Price displays might lead physicians to order fewer tests for 
several reasons. Price displays may have a social conscience 
effect, meaning that physicians consider whether a test pro-
vides any useful clinical information that would justify the 
resources used. Price displays might also encourage physicians 
to discuss costs with their patients and become more sensitive 
to the financial side effects of their treatment decisions.44
On a potential downside, price displays also might reduce 
orders by motivating and enabling financially self-interested 
behavior, but that would depend critically on the payment 
environment. In a pure fee-for-service environment, in which 
providers are paid separately for each service ordered, there is 
no financial pressure to curtail ordering behavior. Medicare 
physician payments have historically been pure fee for ser-
vice, but Medicare is shifting away from that model and 
beginning to reward physicians for being more efficient.45 In 
a bundled payment arrangement, such as Medicare payments 
for inpatient care, providers face strong financial pressures to 
curtail test ordering—the Hopkins study was conducted in 
this type of payment arrangement. At the other extreme are 
physician offices that provide their own office-based labora-
tory and imaging services.46 In that context, the physician 
directly benefits from increased ordering, and price displays 
could, perversely, increase the number of tests ordered.
Estimated Impact on Health Spending
The estimated 10-year savings from this policy option is $27 
billion, with a range from $11 to $65 billion (see Table 2).
Physician-Targeted Policy Intervention
Require that EHRs provide price data to physicians when 
ordering laboratory and imaging services. Estimated 
reduction in health spending over 10 years: $27 billion.
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Figure 4
Range of Impacts of Price Displays on Physician Ordering Behavior
Note: The hi-lo bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals (+/- 1.96 standard errors).
Sources:
1 Hampers, Louis C., et al., “The Effect of Price Information on Test-Ordering Behavior and Patient Outcomes in a Pediatric Emergency Department,” Pediatrics, Vol. 103 (April 
1999). 
2 Cummings, Michael K., et al., “The Effects of Price Information on Physicians’ Test-Ordering Behavior: Ordering of Diagnostic Tests,” Medical Care, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1982). 
3 Feldman, Leonard S., et al., “Impact of Providing Fee Data on Laboratory Test Ordering: A Controlled Clinical Trial,” JAMA Internal Medicine, Vol. 173, No. 10 (May 27, 2013).
4 Tierney, William M., Michael E. Miller and Clement J. McDonald, “The Effect on Test Ordering of Informing Physicains of the Charges for Outpatient Diagnostic Tests,” The New 
England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 322, No. 21 (May 1990). 
5 Billi, John E., et al., “The Effects of a Low-Cost Intervention Program on Hospital Costs,” Journal of General Internal Medicine, Vol. 7, No. 4 (July/August 1992). 
6 Bates, David W., et al., “Does the Computerized Display of Charges Affect Inpatient Ancillary Test Utilization?” Archives of Internal Medicine, Vol. 157, No. 21 (November 1997). 
7 Ibid.
8 Durand, Daniel J., et al., “Provider Cost Transparency Alone Has No Impact on Inpatient Imaging Utilization,” Journal of American College of Radiology, Vol. 10, No. 2 (February 
2013). 
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Ban gag clauses between health plans and providers. 
So-called gag clauses—contractual terms that prohibit 
health plans and providers from disclosing the prices they 
have negotiated with each other—can have both pro- and 
anti-competitive effects. The pro-competitive rationale for 
allowing gag clauses is that they can promote negotiated 
discounts. For example, a hospital may be more willing 
to offer a discounted price to one health plan if that plan 
agrees not to reveal the discount to other plans or hospitals. 
But, from an employer’s perspective, gag clauses can 
impede comparison shopping. They offer carriers an excuse 
not to provide their claims data to third-party price trans-
parency vendors, and they create gaps in the price data 
available in those tools. Employers could demand that their 
carriers not include gag clauses in their provider contracts, 
or policymakers could ban them altogether as California 
has recently done.49
Make Medicare claims data with physician identi-
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fiers available for wider use. In June, 2013, Sens. Ron 
Wyden (D) and Chuck Grassley (R) introduced legisla-
tion that would require CMS to make Medicare claims 
data freely and publicly available, with provider identifiers 
and detailed descriptions of the services provided and 
amounts paid.50 The goals of that legislation—to expose 
providers and hold them more accountable—have been 
at least partly achieved by the administration’s release of 
detailed hospital and physician claims data. But health 
plans and employers will likely find the current public 
releases of Medicare data only partially satisfying. Those 
releases can reveal some instances of egregious misbe-
havior,51 but profiling providers in a sophisticated way 
requires data that are much more detailed. CMS could 
support more sophisticated analyses by streamlining the 
process of obtaining Medicare claims data and reducing 
the costs of the files.
Include physician identifiers in all-payer claims data-
bases and clarify that health plans can use those APCDs to 
profile physicians. As more states move to set up APCDs, 
key decisions include whether to include identifiers for 
individual physicians and physician groups, and whether 
and how to limit reports on physician behavior. One option 
is to include identifiers for individual physicians that are 
linkable with external data sources, such as the national 
provider identifier, or identifiers for physician groups, with 
the stipulation that the APCD can be used to measure and 
report performance and price data and to build tiered-
provider networks that vary patient cost sharing depending 
on the provider used.
Policymaker-Targeted Policy Options
Establish state-based all-payer claims databases to mea-
sure and report hospital prices. This approach would 
mandate that all carriers provide claims data to a state 
agency in a standardized format. The advantage of this 
approach is that all employers, even smaller ones and 
those buying fully insured plans, can access data on the 
prices their plans have negotiated with different provid-
ers and assess whether those prices are reasonable. The 
disadvantage is that it requires the state and health plans 
to dedicate nontrivial resources to the collection and pro-
cessing of the data (see page 15 for a detailed example of 
this policy option).
Table 2
Price Displays Included in Stage III Requirements for Meaningful Use of Electronic Health Records: 
Estimated Effects on U.S. Health Spending
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 10-Year 
Total
Estimated Effect on Health 
Spending (billions)
$0.0 $0.0 -$0.7 -$2.4 -$3.1 -$3.6 -$3.9 -$4.1 -$4.4 -$4.6 -$26.9
Lower Bound $0.0 $0.0 -$0.3 -$1.0 -$1.2 -$1.4 -$1.6 -$1.6 -$1.7 -$1.8 -$10.6
Upper Bound $0.0 $0.0 -$1.7 -$5.8 -$7.4 -$8.7 -$9.5 -$10.0 -$10.5 -$11.1 -$64.8
Spending on Labs and Imaging 
Services in Inpatient Hospital 
Setting (billions)
 $35  $37  $39  $42  $44  $47  $50  $53  $57  $61
Spending on Labs and Imaging 
Services in Outpatient Hospital 
Setting (billions)
 $48  $50  $53  $57  $60  $64  $68  $73  $77  $82
Spending on Labs and Imaging 
Services in Physician Office   
(billions)
 $55  $58  $61  $64  $68  $72  $77  $82  $88  $94
Spending on Labs and Imaging 
Services in Freestanding Setting 
(billions)
 $55  $58  $61  $64  $68  $72  $77  $82  $88  $94
Cost of Upgrading Electronic 
Health Records to Include Price 
Displays (billions)
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.02 $0.02 $0.03 $0.03 $0.03 $0.03 $0.03
Source: Authors’ calculations combining National Health Expenditures data, estimated shares of physicians with access to price data at the point of order entry and the authors’ 
projected adoption of electronic health records that are compliant with stage III meaningful use requirements.
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Background
An APCD has been defined as “a database, created by 
state legislative mandate, that typically includes data 
derived from medical, pharmacy, and dental claims, com-
bined with eligibility and provider files from private and 
public payers, including insurance carriers (medical, den-
tal, third-party administrators, pharmacy benefit manag-
ers, and public payers (Medicaid, Medicare).”52 APCDs 
can be used to measure a range of outcomes, including 
the use of preventive services, the efficiency of individual 
physicians and the prevalence of specific diseases.
This policy intervention focuses on one specific use of 
APCDs: measuring and publicly reporting the prices that 
private health plans have negotiated with individual hos-
pitals. States with this type of APCD-based hospital price 
reporting include Massachusetts,53 New Hampshire,54 
Maine55 and Rhode Island.56 Other states, including 
Minnesota, are developing a similar system.57 Although 
the formats of these price reports vary, they all provide 
comparisons of negotiated prices that are hospital-specific 
and, in some cases, health plan-specific.
Patients may occasionally consult APCD-based hospi-
tal price reports, but they are not the primary audience.58 
The more significant audiences for these price reports are 
employers, health plans and policymakers. Employers can 
use the price data to identify high-price providers and, 
with health plans, develop strategies to steer patients away 
from these providers. Policymakers can use the price 
reports to assess the level of competition, or lack thereof, 
in the market for hospital care.
In Maine, the hospital price reports are specifically 
designed to help employers develop tiered-benefit plans.59 
In New Hampshire the publication of hospital price data 
spurred the development of “site-of-service” health plans 
that have very different out-of-pocket costs depending on 
whether the patient goes, for example, to a hospital out-
patient department or a lower-price freestanding facility. 
In Massachusetts, the publication of hospital price data 
beginning in 2010 fed into a broad movement toward 
payment reform and cost control that is still unfolding. 
The Massachusetts data helped draw attention to the high 
prices and market clout of Partners HealthCare, Boston’s 
“must-have” hospital system, and some independent hos-
pitals in other parts of the state.
What the Policy Option Would Do
By 2019, private health plans in all states would be 
required to submit claims data in a standardized format 
to an all-payer claims database, and by 2022, APCDs in 
all states would be used to produce publicly available 
hospital-specific price reports. (These are the earliest fea-
sible dates.) This option would be modeled on the Maine 
Health Data Organization’s Hospital Cost Comparison for 
Hospital Tiered Benefit report.60 This intervention could 
be accomplished by state legislation, such as in New 
Hampshire, Maine and Massachusetts, and would require 
either general funding or a specific fee on payment of 
health claims. The intervention would require private 
plans to submit claims data in a standardized format 
and create an infrastructure for analyzing the data and 
reporting results. If enacted, this policy would expand the 
proportion of the U.S. population living in states with an 
APCD from less than 10 percent to about 90 percent (see 
Figure 5).
Estimated Impact on Health Spending
This intervention produces an estimated $61 billion 
reduction in health spending over 10 years, although the 
range of uncertainty is wide, from no savings to around 
$150 billion (see Table 3). The savings are assumed to 
result from a mixture of the responses observed in New 
Hampshire and Massachusetts: 1) increased employer 
interest in narrow-network and tiered-network benefit 
designs; 2) increased pressure on high-price hospitals 
to justify those prices and/or reduce prices; and 3) 
increased discussion of policy options for controlling 
prices, such as all-payer rate setting. The range is very 
wide because evidence is extremely limited, mainly 
because insufficient time has passed to evaluate existing 
APCD impacts.
Policymaker-Targeted Policy Intervention 
Gather and report hospital-specific prices using state all-
payer claims databases. Estimated reduction in health 
spending over 10 years: $61 billion.
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Incorporate an assessment of unit prices into health 
insurance rate reviews. The health insurance rate review 
process currently focuses on the question of whether an 
insurer’s premiums are reasonable relative to its claims 
costs. The rate review process could be expanded to include 
an assessment of whether an insurer has negotiated reason-
able unit prices with providers and, if not, the rate request 
could be denied. In a well-functioning market, that type 
of price review would be unnecessary because compet-
ing providers would bid prices down to an efficient level. 
But, given increasing consolidation on the provider side, 
price-based rate reviews could help insurers push back and 
demand lower prices, at least for their fully insured prod-
ucts.
Expanding the rate review process in this way would 
have uncertain impacts and would represent a significant, 
but not unprecedented, departure from current practice. 
CMS has recently begun to support state-based price trans-
parency efforts under the rubric of strengthening the rate 
review process,61 and New Hampshire has begun examin-
ing cost drivers, including negotiated prices, as part of rate 
review.62
Create a price and spending atlas for the privately 
insured. The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care has trans-
formed health policy discussions in the United States by 
providing a vast trove of detailed market- and hospital-level 
data on spending and practice patterns from the Medicare 
fee-for-service program.63 Analyses using the Dartmouth 
Atlas data shine a spotlight on wide variations in practice 
patterns and the use of discretionary services. No analog 
to the Dartmouth Atlas exists for the privately insured, 
although there are some early limited efforts.64
A spending atlas for the privately insured would include 
market-level data on negotiated prices and utilization for 
different service categories, such as inpatient hospital care 
and outpatient imaging. Creating such a resource would 
be a major undertaking, requiring either the creation of 
a new standardized national multi-payer claims database 
or combining existing claims databases. For example, the 
combination of the Health Care Cost Institute’s database 
Figure 5
Share of the U.S. Population Living in a State with an All-Payer Claims Database Used to Report 
Hospital Prices
Sources: Authors’ calculations combining state population estimates for each year from the State Health Expenditures data published by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services and the authors’ estimates based on various sources of when each state first made hospital prices publicly available.
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Table 3
States Using All-Payer Claims Databases (APCDs) to Measure and Report Hospital Prices: 
Estimated Effects on U.S. Health Spending
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 10-Year 
Total
Estimated Effect on Health 
Spending (billions)
$0.0 -$1.0 -$2.1 -$3.3 -$4.7 -$6.3 -$8.1 -$10.0 -$12.2 -$12.9 -$60.7
Lower Bound $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.1 $0.1 $0.1 $0.1 $0.1 $0.2 $0.2 $0.8
Upper Bound $0.0 -$2.5 -$5.3 -$8.4 -$12.0 -$15.9 -$20.4 -$25.3 -$30.7 -$32.6 -$153.1
Spending on Hospital Care for 
the Privately Insured (billions)  $455  $480  $510  $541  $576  $612  $653  $694  $739  $787
Share of U.S. Population in 
States with APCD-Based 
Hospital Price Reporting—
Baseline
4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 6% 6% 6% 7%
Share of U.S. Population in 
States with APCD-Based 
Hospital Price Reporting—Policy 
Option
4% 14% 25% 36% 47% 58% 68% 79% 90% 90%
Source: Authors’ calculations combining National Health Expenditures data, estimated shares of the population in states with hospital price reporting based on an APCD and the 
authors’ analysis of the effect of APCD-based hospital price reporting on hospital spending.
(which includes claims data from enrollees in Aetna, 
Humana, Kaiser Permanente and UnitedHealthcare) with 
Blue Health Intelligence’s database (which includes claims 
data for enrollees in many Blue plans) would cover a large 
majority of the privately insured. The hurdles to overcome 
would include technical challenges—integrating claims data 
from multiple insurers requires intensive cleaning and stan-
dardization—and resistance from healthcare analytics firms 
that view these claims data as a vital strategic asset.
Discussion
This analysis, focusing on different approaches to price 
transparency, leads to three broad conclusions. First, the 
potential reductions in health spending are substantial in 
dollar terms—more than $100 billion over the next decade 
if all three interventions were undertaken—but small rela-
tive to total health spending over that period. Second, the 
range of estimated impacts is very wide. That uncertainty 
is partly because these interventions have not been widely 
implemented and many have not been carefully evaluated. 
In addition, details will be important in how effective these 
approaches would be in reducing spending. 
Third, the effects of price transparency depend critically 
on the context in which prices are presented. Price trans-
parency can have a major impact if, and only if, it is joined 
with other shifts in healthcare financing. These shifts 
include improvements in quality measurement, changes in 
benefit design that make patients more sensitive to price 
differences across providers, and a higher proportion of 
provider payment coming under reformed approaches that 
diminish the role of fee for service and place providers at 
risk for spending per episode or for population spending. 
Price transparency seems unlikely, by itself, to transform 
the healthcare system, but it can play a role in support-
ing reforms in benefit design and provider payment and 
increasing their effectiveness. Maximizing the impact of 
price transparency will require tailoring price information 
to different audiences—patients, employers, physicians, 
health plans, and policymakers—and heightening the 
incentives for those audiences to use the information.
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Healthcare Price Transparency:                                              
Policy Approaches and Estimated Impacts on Spending
Technical Appendix
Method for Estimating Spending Impacts   
of Selected Policy Options
The analysis of each of the three policy interventions fol-
lows the same general approach. The first step is to project 
baseline total healthcare spending.1 The second step is to 
estimate the scope of spending that would be affected by 
the intervention. For example, making price tools avail-
able to the privately insured would only impact spending 
by the privately insured. The third step is to estimate the 
availability of price information in two scenarios: baseline 
and policy intervention. The baseline takes into account 
that price information is becoming more available, which 
will continue, even in the absence of any intervention. The 
fourth step is to estimate a range of impacts of the availabil-
ity of price information on in-scope spending.
Patient-Targeted Price Tool
The first step in this estimate was to project the privately 
insured population and then project the share of the pri-
vately insured population with access to a price tool under 
the baseline and under the policy intervention. The share 
of the population with private insurance has declined 
fairly steadily since 2000, with a large decline during the 
Great Recession of 2007-09. The analysis projects that 
this decline will continue over the next 10 years. Based on 
private health plan enrollment data from HealthLeaders 
InterStudy and a review of the availability of price tools in 
private plans, the share of the privately insured population 
with access to a price tool has grown rapidly over the last 
decade. The analysis projects that, even without any policy 
intervention, the share of the privately insured with access 
to a price tool will continue to increase, reaching 90 percent 
in 2023. Under the policy intervention, that share reaches 
95 percent instead, with between 5 percent and 10 percent 
more of the privately insured population gaining access to a 
tool than under baseline.
The second step in the analysis was to estimate total 
spending on medical services for the privately insured. The 
third step was to estimate the effect of having a price tool 
on medical spending among the privately insured. The 
key study used for this step is a working paper by Lieber 
(2013)2 that examined the impact on prices from providing 
the phone-based Compass price tool to corporate employ-
ees of a large restaurant chain. The key finding is that the 
prices paid for services used by employees with access to 
the price tool declined by 3.8 percent relative to a control 
group of non-corporate employees. The study found that 
employees with access to Compass called to get price infor-
mation for services accounting for between 11 percent and 
17 percent of their spending. But, price reductions for those 
services were substantial, because employees apparently 
switched to lower-price providers.
The third step in the analysis was to estimate the added 
cost of providing price tools to more people—$30 per 
enrollee per year in 2014. That cost reflects collecting and 
analyzing price data and creating and maintaining a web-
site and call center to disseminate the price data. The total 
additional cost of providing price tools to a broader popu-
lation is about $3 billion over 10 years.
The lower-bound estimate assumes that expanding the 
availability of price tools has an impact only one-quarter as 
large as estimated by Lieber (2013). Even though Lieber’s 
analysis found significant savings, those savings might not 
apply to the 5 percent to 10 percent of the privately insured 
that would gain access to a price tool through the policy 
intervention. Health plans vary in benefit design, and price 
tools are not useful with some benefit designs—those plans 
are unlikely to provide a price tool unless it is required. For 
example, health maintenance organization (HMO) plans typ-
ically charge flat copayments for physician and hospital vis-
its—providing price information to enrollees in those HMO 
plans will make no difference to their choice of provider.
The upper-bound estimate assumes a spending impact 
twice as large as estimated by Lieber (2013). That could 
occur if increased price shopping by patients puts pres-
sure on providers to temper the prices they negotiate with 
health plans, resulting in lower prices being paid both for 
patients who shop and for those who do not. Anecdotal 
reports suggest that providers will reduce their “ask” if 
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plans are actively steering patients to lower-price provid-
ers. For example, high-price hospitals in California report-
edly reduced their prices for knee and hip replacements 
to meet the reference price CalPERS had established.3 The 
upper-bound effect could also occur if health plans shift to 
benefit designs that heighten patients’ sensitivity to price—
examples include general deductibles, reference pricing and 
coinsurance rather than copayments.
All-Payer Claims Database
The first step in estimating the impact of this intervention 
was to project the growth under baseline in the share of the 
U.S. population living in a state with hospital price report-
ing. That share has grown over the last decade to about 4 
percent of the population, and it is projected to continue 
to grow even in the absence of any intervention. Under 
the policy intervention, that population share would grow 
much more quickly and would reach 90 percent in 2022.
The second step was to estimate the impact of hospital 
price reporting on spending among the privately insured. 
Unfortunately, there is only one published estimate of the 
effects of hospital price reporting. That study examined 
the early impacts of New Hampshire’s price transparency 
initiative and found no impact on variation.4 To augment 
the evidence base, hospital cost reports were used to com-
pare trends in hospital prices in intervention states (New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Maine and Rhode Island) ver-
sus all other states. Price is defined as net operating rev-
enue per discharge equivalent—this price measure includes 
all payers and both inpatient and outpatient services.5
As shown in Technical Appendix Figure 1, hospital pric-
es in the mid-2000s in the intervention states were 1percent 
or 2 percent above average. But, starting in 2008, around 
the time the intervention states were implementing report-
ing systems, hospital prices in the intervention states began 
to grow slowly relative to other states, ending about 4 per-
cent below the national average in 2010-11. Because private 
payers account for roughly half of hospitals’ total revenues, 
a 5-percent decline in all-payer prices corresponds roughly 
to a 10 percent decline in private-payer prices. Interpreting 
this finding is complicated by the fact that Massachusetts, 
which is the largest of the intervention states, implemented 
several major healthcare financing changes along with 
initiating hospital price reporting. The changes included 
the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts’ Alternative 
Quality Contract,6 a requirement that health plans offer a 
tiered-benefit option and a state prohibition on anticom-
petitive contracting practices, such most-favored nation 
clauses in hospital contracts, and a state global spending 
target. It is impossible to know exactly how much of the 
observed price slowdown in the intervention states was a 
result of price reporting per se and how much was other 
interventions adopted around the same time. The analysis 
assumes that price reporting would lead to a 2-percent 
reduction in private prices, which corresponds to roughly 
one-fifth of the apparent decline in private prices.
The third step in the analysis was to estimate the admin-
istrative costs to plans and to state agencies of supplying 
claims data, analyzing claims data and reporting prices. The 
analysis assumed that operating that type of system would 
cost $3 million per state per year in 2014, and that the 
amount would grow with inflation.
The lower-bound estimate assumes that price reporting 
has no impact on hospital prices, and that the only effect 
is the added administrative costs of the data collection and 
analysis. This assumption would hold true if the appar-
ent price slowdown in the intervention states is a result of 
factors other than price reporting. The upper bound esti-
mate assumes that private hospital prices are reduced by 5 
percent, roughly half of the apparent private price decline. 
That upper bound estimate assumes that price reporting 
played an important role in ushering in a set of market 
changes in New England, and that similar changes can 
occur elsewhere.
Electronic Health Record Price Displays
The first step in the analysis was to project increases over 
time in the share of hospitals and office-based physi-
cians meeting stage III meaningful use requirements (see 
Technical Appendix Figure 2)—these are the providers that, 
under the policy intervention, would have prices displayed 
at the point of order entry for laboratory and imaging ser-
vices.7 These projections were based on the observed rapid 
increases over the last few years in the share of providers 
meeting stage I meaningful use requirements.
The second step in the analysis was to estimate the 
effects of price displays on spending on laboratory and 
imaging services. To do this, baseline spending on labora-
tory and imaging services was estimated separately for four 
settings: hospital inpatient, hospital outpatient, freestand-
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ing facility and physician office-based facility. These four 
settings differ in the strength of the financial incentives 
for providers to rein in their ordering behavior. Financial 
incentives are strongest in the hospital inpatient setting and 
weakest in the physician office-based setting. The analysis 
assumes that in the hospital inpatient setting price displays 
would reduce spending on laboratory and imaging services 
by 5 percent. That estimate is near the center of the range 
of estimates in the literature.8 The spending reductions in 
the other settings were assumed to be smaller: half as large 
in the hospital outpatient setting, one-quarter as large in 
the freestanding setting and one-tenth as large in the physi-
cian office-based setting.
The third step was to estimate the costs of upgrading 
EHR systems to include the price displays. The analysis 
assumes that 15 vendors supply CPOE systems and that 
adding price displays to their CPOE systems costs each 
vendor $1 million a year. These costs are quite small rela-
tive to the estimated spending effects.
The lower-bound estimate assumes that requiring price 
displays will have a much smaller impact on ordering 
behavior. This could occur if price displays, even without 
any policy intervention, are adopted over time in settings 
where the financial incentives support their use. The upper 
bound estimate reflects a strengthening over time in the 
financial incentives for providers to pay attention to their 
ordering behavior. One movement in that direction is the 
assignment of physicians to tiers based on their resource 
use patterns. A second such trend is the expansion of 
accountable care organizations in both Medicare and pri-
vate plans—these arrangements put groups of medical pro-
viders partially at risk for the total spending of a panel of 
patients. A third potentially important change is Medicare’s 
implementation of the physician value-based payment 
modifier, which will adjust Medicare physician fees based 
on quality metrics and the total costs of their patient panel 
relative to a benchmark.9
Technical Appendix Figure 1
Hospital Price Trends in States Measuring and Reporting Hospital Prices Compared to National Trends
Notes: Discharge equivalents are a measure of hospitals’ overall output, including inpatient and outpatient services. Discharge equivalents equal a hospital’s inpatient discharges 
multiplied by the ratio of total operating costs over inpatient hospital operating costs. The percentages indicate the difference between adopting states—Massachusetts, Maine, 
New Hampshire and Rhode Island—and other states.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Medicare hospital cost reports from 1996 through 2013.
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Technical Appendix Figure 2
Projected Share of Hospitals and Physicians Complying with Electronic Health Record Stage III 
Meaningful Use Requirements
Note: The share of hospitals meeting stage III requirements is weighted by hospital size.
Source: Authors’ projections based on an analysis of historical data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services on trends in compliance with stage I meaningful use 
requirements.
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